Further examination of optimal fire support strategies. by Hill, Robert John III
FURTHER EXAMINATION OF
OPTIMAL FIRE SUPPORT STRATEGIES
Robert John Hi 11







OPTIMAL FIRE SUPPORT STRATEGIES
by •





Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
T 163246

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Wh»n D.(. 1Entered)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONSBEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subline)
A Further Examination of Optimal
Fire Support Strategies
5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
Master's Thesis;
September 1974
6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHORf*;
Robert John Hill III
8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERr^J
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK
AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS





13. NUMBER OF PAGES
25
U. MONITORING AGENCY NAME » AODRESSf// d(«<>ren( Irom Controlllna Olllce)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
IS. SECURITY CLASS, (ol thi, report;
Unclassified
15a. DECLASSIFI CATION/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION ST ATEMEN T Co/ (h(» ReporO
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol tha abttraci »nfr»d In Block 30, H dlllermt from Report)
IB. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
19. KEY WORDS (Conllnue on reverse elde II neceeeery end Identity by block number)
Differential Games; Fire Support Allocation
20. ABSTRACT (Continue
€}n reveree elde It neceeemry and Identity by block number)
Previous thesis research has studied optimal time-se-
quential artillery fire distribution strategies in an attack
scenario by considering a two-person, zero-sum, determinis-
tic differential game. This past work is reviewed and ex-
tended by developing additional computational considerations
(i.e., manifold of discontinuity for the dual variables) and
DD ,^°r73 1473
(Page 1)
EDITION OF I NOV 6S IS OBSOLETE
S/N OlOJ-OU- 6601
I
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Dale Entered)

CtCUWlTY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGErH^»n Data Enterad)
Block 20 - ABSTRACT (Cont.)
incorporating these into an existing digital computer pro-
gram for the determination of optimal time-sequential fire
support strategies. The military significance and implica-
tions of the structure of an optimal fire distribution pol-
icy are discussed.
DD Form 1473 (BACK)
,
1 Jan 7?
S/N 0102-014-GGOl security classification of this PAOErWTian Data Enffd)

A Further Examination of
Optimal Fire Support Strategies
by
Robert John ,Hill III
Captain, United States Army
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1965
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of








Previous thesis research has studied optimal time-sequen-
tial artillery fire distribution strategies in an attack
scenario by considering a two-person, zero-sum, deterministic
differential game. This past work is reviewed and extended
by developing additional computational considerations (i.e.,
manifold of discontinuity for the dual variables) and in-
corporating these into an existing digital computer program
for the determination of optimal time-sequential fire support
strategies. The military significance and implications of




I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE 7
II. DEVELOPMENT OF OPTIMAL TIME-SEQUENTIAL FIRE
SUPPORT STRATEGIES ^ 10
A. THE COMBAT SCENARIO 10
B. DIFFERENTIAL GAME FORMULATION 12
C. DEVELOPMENT OF SOLUTION 13
III. FILLING THE "VOID" 15
A. MODIFICATION OF THE COMPUTATIONAL ROUTINE 15
B. EXAMPLE OF FILLING THE "VOID" 16
IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MODEL AND ITS SOLUTION 19
A. INTERPRETATION OF THE SOLUTION 19
B. FUTURE CONCERNS ~ 21
V. SUMMARY 22
LIST OF REFERENCES 23
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 24

NOTATION
Xi(t), X2(t), Yi(t), YaCt) — State variables, number of
survivors of Xi , X2 , Yi , Y2 at time t.
T — Specified duration of the "approach to contact".
PiCt), P2(t), qi(t), q2(t) — Adjoint (dual) variables, the
value of Xi , X2 , Yi , Y2 respectively at time t.
ai — Attrition rate coefficient, average rate at which
are Y2 attrits Xi.
a2 — Average rate at which one Y2 attrits X2
•
c — Average rate at which one Yi attrits Xi
.
bi — Average rate at which one X2 attrits Yi
b2 — Average rate at which one X2 attrits Y2
v — Decision (control) variable, fraction of Y2 directed
at Xi , £ V < 1.
u — Fraction of X2 directed at Yi , £ u £ 1.
V* , u* — Optimal values of v and u.
J — Criterion functional (objective function).
T — Backwards time, x = T - t.

I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE
The subject of fire support allocation in military con-
flict has received considerable attention during the last
few years, particularly in the area of optimizing the dis-
tribution of limited fire support resources. One specific
example of the application of optimization techniques to
such allocation problems is a paper by Kawara [1] in the
field of differential games. In an extension of the work of
Weiss [2], he examined the optimal strategies of two heter-
ogeneous forces in a scenario in which each force consisted
of a combat unit (such as infantry) and a support unit (such
as artillery) wherein the strategy of each force was the
distribution it made of its supporting fires between the
other's infantry and artillery. Kawara concluded from his
analysis that, given the artillery units of each opponent
are never reduced to zero, the optimal strategies of the
opponents are independent of force levels.
Taylor [3] showed, for a given set of combat attrition
equations such as used by Kawara, that optimal strategies
are a function of the criterion functional (objective func-
tion), and that he (Kawara) picked the only type of criterion
functional — the ratio of combatants at the end of the en-
gagement — which produced optimal strategies completely in-
dependent of force levels. Taylor also examined a modified
version of Kawara' s model in order to show that not only can
the optimal strategy of one of the combatants depend directly

on the enemy force levels, but also that the optimal strategy
of that side is to sometimes split its supporting fires be-
tween the enemy's infantry and artillery.
Ellis [4] considered in his thesis this same two-person,
zero-sum differential game and its solution procedure (as
outlined by Taylor) which consisted of synthesizing extremal
trajectories using a backwards sweep process. For his the-
sis he constructed a lengthy computer program which numeri-
cally implemented the backwards sweep process and allowed
him to flood the state space with extremal trajectories. As
an output from his program, Ellis created a two-dimensional
computerized plot which most vividly illuminates the depend-
ence of strategy on force levels in Taylor's model.
However, while examining several cases of Taylor's scena-
rio, Ellis found that, for several combinations of parameters
and values of state variables used to initialize the back-
wards sweep process, it was not possible to reach certain
beginning values of the state space. This lack of trajec-
tories passing through certain portions of the five-dimen-
sional state space was coined as a "void" by Taylor. Taylor
[3] subsequently provided an analytical explanation for the
existence of the "void" discovered by Ellis, and developed
a candidate solution for filling it with optimal trajectories,
A trajectory generated by a realization of a strategy
which satisfies the necessary conditions of optimality for
all points in time.
8

The purpose of this thesis was to incorporate Taylor's
solution for filling the "void" into the computational rou-
tine developed by Ellis, to numerically solve the differen-
tial game with the modified routine, and to demonstrate with




II. DEVELOPMENT OF OPTIMAL TIME-SEQUENTIAL
FIRE SUPPORT STRATEGIES
A. THE COMBAT SCENARIO
The combat scenario examined by Taylor [3] (extending
previous work by Kawara [1] and Weiss [2]) consisted of two
opposing heterogeneous forces in a fixed duration "approach
to contact" wherein one's infantry, Xi, is attacking the
other's infantry, Yi . The game terminates at the moment
that contact (close combat) between combatants occurs (after
a fixed time, T), whereupon artillery fires must be shifted
from the enemy's infantry in order to preclude the inflict-
ing of casualties on one's own infantry. Figure 1 depicts




Figure 1. The Tactical Situation
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As can be seen, each side's artillery can distribute its
fires with complete latitude at its enemy's infantry and/or
artillery. All attrition caused by artillery fires was as-
sumed by Taylor to follow a "linear-law" attrition process,
except for the defender's artillery, Y2 , against the attack-
er's artillery, X2 , which was formulated as following a
"square-law" attrition process in as much as it was felt the
defender has superior target acquisition capability. Due to
the condition that the attacker's infantry, Xi , is moving
toward the defender's infantry, Yj , it was assumed that the
Yi fires on Xi followed a "linear-law" attrition process,
reflecting the difficulty of firing aimed fire at a moving
target. One should also notice in Figure 1 that Xi has been
pictured as placing no fires on Yi , so assumed because of
the difficulty of delivering effective fire while in rapid
movement to contact. The objective of both opponents during
the "approach to contact" is to maximize the ratio of its
infantry to its opponent's infantry at the moment the "ap-
proach to contact" phase is ended and "close combat" begins.
11

B. DIFFERENTIAL GAME FORMULATION
Taylor [3] modeled the scenario in section II. A. as a
two-person, zero-sum differential game as follows:
MAXIMIZE MINIMIZE J = Xi(T)/Yi(T) ^
U V
Subject To: dXj /dt = -vajXiYz - cXjYi (=f i )
dXz/dt = -(l-v)a2Y2 (=f 2
)
dYi/dt = -ubiYjXz (=gi)
dY2/dt = -(l-U)b2Y2X2 (=g2)
<_ u(t) £ 1 £ v(t) <_ 1
< Y.(t) = Y.
^
^ ^ y i=l,2 (SVIC's)
< X.(t) = X.
J
Initial Conditions: X.(t=0) = X"? , Y.(t=0) = Y? , i=l,2
It is quite evident that the state variable inequality
constraints (SVIC's) hold for all the state variables (X.,
Y., i=l,2) except for X2 which can take on negative values,
mathematically speaking; however, for the purposes of his
examination, Taylor considered X2 to remain strictly posi-
tive, thus by-passing any need for consideration of the
problems generated by SVIC's, such as discussed in Speyer
[5].
^ In general J = J(t,X,Y, u,v) = G{X(T),Y(T)}
T
+ {, L{s,X(s),Y(s),u(s),v(s)}ds, but for
Taylor's scenario, J = G{X(T),Y(T)} + = Xi(T)/Yi(T).
12

C. DEVELOPMENT OF SOLUTION
In generating the solution to the differential game pre-
sented in section II. B., Taylor applied a method similar in
form to that used in optimal control problems, utilizing the
"Maximum Principle" as applied to differential games such as
in [6] and the theory of singular extremals. At this time,
it should be noted that the strategies developed by Taylor
were not shown to satisfy sufficient conditions for optimal-
ity, to do so being beyond the scope of the current investi-
gation.
The general steps followed by Taylor in generating the
extremal controls to the differential game in section II. B.
are outlined below:
1. Introduce the dual (adjoint) variables pi(t), P2(t),
qi(t), qzCt) which correspond to the state variables Xi(t),
XzCt), Yi(t), Y2(t), respectively.
[p.(t) = 9W(t,X,Y)/8X.(t)
where W(t,X,X) is dif ferentiable and
W = (t,X,Y) = W{t=0,X°,Y''; t=T, X(T) , Y(T) }
= MAXIMUM MINIMUM J = Xi(T)/Yi(T)]
u(to,T) v(to,T)
2. Form the Hamiltonian H:
2





+ q.g. )•1=1^^1 1 ^i^'i'
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3. Determine the extremal strategic variable pair (ex-
tremal controls), (u*,v*), by maximize-minimizing the Harail-
tonian.







5. Determine the terminal boundary conditions for the
adjoint variables in preparation for synthesizing the ex-
tremals in backwards time (x):
p^(t=T) = P^(t=0) = 8G{X(T),Y(T)}/3X^(T)
= 3{Xi(T)/Yi(T)}/8X^(T)
q^(t=T) = q^(T=0) = 9G{X(T),Y(T)}/9Y^(T)
= 3{Xi(T)/Yi(T)}/3Y^(T)
for i=l,2
6. Compute the amount of discontinuous jump made by the
adjoint variables across a manifold of discontinuity of both
u* and v*, simultaneously. A "void" in the state space
occurs only in those cases where a discontinuity in the ad-
joint variables exists, (Alternatively speaking, this final
step covers the procedure for filling the "void", as devel-
oped by Taylor [3] after the discovery of the existence of
the "void" by Ellis [4]
.
)




III. FILLING THE "VOID"
A. MODIFICATION OF THE COMPUTATIONAL ROUTINE
The computer program developed by Ellis [4] which numer-
ically synthesized the extremal controls to the differential
game in section II. B. using Taylor's original (before the
discovery of the state space "void") solution, consisted of
546 lines of Fortran IV coding. Generally, the program en-
compassed steps 1 through 5 listed in section II. C.
In order to make an alteration to Ellis' program (to im-
plement the filling of the "void", step 6 in section II. C.)
without inadvertently and erroneously changing the basic
logic scheme, it was first necessary to develop a flowchart
outlining the logic used by Ellis.
A detailed flowchart showing all the intricacies of meth-
ods used in the program, such as the Runge-Kutta fourth-order
numerical integration algorithm or the Newton-Raphson routine
for numerically solving transcendental equations, would have
been of no practical use; therefore, a block-type flowchart
showing the inter-relationships between the critical segments
of the backwards sweep process was drawn to model the over-
all procedure of extremal synthesis and graphical plotting.
Key flag and count variables were included in the diagram as
well as all significant logic nodes.
An immediate spinoff from the completed flowchart was to
catch several errors in Ellis' train of logic which had not
been previously detected during initial program operation
15

and debugging. Once Taylor's differential game solution was
clearly understood, and Ellis' program steps were associated
one-to-one with the solution steps, the incorporation of
Taylor's solution for filling the "void" into Ellis' program
was relatively uncomplicated, ultimately requiring only about
50 lines of Fortran IV coding.
Lastly, fine tuning of the numerical integration time
steps affected by the modification was necessary in order to
insure acceptable error level in the numerical approximations.
(The verification of the numerical integration coding was
previously accomplished by Ellis, and, therefore, not re-
peated here. )
B. EXAMPLE OF FILLING THE "VOID"
Figure 2 is a graphical plot, done on an IBM 360 computer,
of a specific case of the differential game examined by Tay-
lor in which a discontinuity in the adjoint (dual) variables
existed. Note the dearth of trajectories through a large
3portion of the two-dimensional state space (Z,t)
,
where t
occurs during the initial stages of the approach to contact.
The absence of extremal trajectories passing through those
portions of the state space is what has been called the
"void".
3
Z = Yi(t)/Y2(t) was picked by Ellis [4] as a suitable
transformed state variable to demonstrate the force level
dependence of optimal strategies.
16

Figure 2. The "Void"
Moreover, once the modification to Ellis' computer pro-
gram (incorporating the discontinuous jump of the adjoint
variables p and ^ at the manifold of discontinuity of u* and
V*) was applied, this same "void" was subsequently flooded





Figure 3. The Filled "Void"
To explain Figures 2 and 3 further, the discontinuity of
V* occurs on the v* transition surface, and the discontinuity
of u* on the u* transition surface, depicted by the dark ex-
tremal trajectory in Figure 3. The intersection of these
two transition surfaces, indicated by a circle in both Fig-
ures 2 and 3, is the point in backwards time where the "void"
occurs, as clearly seen in Figure 2.
18

IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MODEL AND ITS SOLUTION
A. INTERPRETATION OF THE SOLUTION
The first objective of Taylor's [3] work was to show
that optimal strategies are not necessarily independent of
force levels; this Ellis [4] aptly illustrated by his plot-
ting the transformed state variable, Z, against time, which
indicated the shift of strategy in conjunction with particu-
lar enemy force levels. Even more vividly, under certain
circumstances in Taylor's solution, the following equation
holds:
u = {b2/(bi+b2)}(l-q2Y2/P2X2)
which demonstrates explicitly the dependence of strategy on
force levels, in this case Y2 and X2 . In mathematical terms,
the strategies are closed-loop strategies in that
U = U{t,X(t),Y(t)} and V = V{ t ,X( t ) , Y( t ) } , or, in other
words, the strategies of the opponents are feedback depend-
ent. In military terms, the significance of these results
is that intelligence concerning the enemy force levels is
extremely important in the development of one's strategy.
Because of the uncertainty inherent in intelligence estimates
in the real world, Taylor's results imply that one's strat-
egy must be continuously reevaluated as a result of the
changing intelligence picture.
The second objective that Taylor sought to accomplish
was to illustrate the fact that supporting fires may be
19

split between opposing forces. There exists in the solution
to Taylor's model specific instances when the optimal strat-
egy is to fire on the enemy's two different forces propor-
tional to their relative strengths; or, mathematically
speaking,
u = b2/(bi+b2), 1-u = bi/(bi+b2)
such that they are attrited at proportionally the same rate,
keeping Z = Yi(t)/Y2(t) constant. This is well illustrated
in the graphical plot developed by Ellis when an extremal
remains at a constant level for a finite period of time as
seen between t* and t** in Figure 4, picturing a single op-





Notwithstanding, the most significant lesson that can be
learned from the combined results of this work, Taylor [3]
and Ellis [4] is aimed not at the military decision maker,
but at the analyst who is attempting to model combat dynam-
ics: in a differential game, the form of the dynamics used
to depict a situation may impose unacceptable characteristics
on the strategies of the game players, causing them to vio-
late very basic concepts from the real world the analyst is
attempting to model, such as in the case of Kawara [1].
B. FUTURE CONCERNS
There appears to be a logical extension of this work
that could be made, possibly to satisfy a Master's Thesis
requirement, beginning with the assignment of appropriate
constants of dimensionality to Taylor's model, such an under-
taking being necessary before the military artist can ef-
fectively interpret the strategy or tactics that the
differential game solution dictates. Once this is accom-
plished, of further interest would be a sensitivity analysis
on the model, using Ellis' program as modified by this
thesis.
For the interested reader, the resultant program, flow-
chart, and computer cards from this work may be obtained
from Associate Professor James G. Taylor, Department of Op-
erations Research and Administrative Sciences, Naval Post-




The method Taylor [3] derived for filling the "void"
found in his original solution to the modified version of
Kawara's [1] differential game has been found to be success-
ful. Such was shown to be true by means of incorporating
the aforementioned method into Ellis' [4] computer routine
for numerically executing Taylor's original solution, and
then looking at "before" and "after" snapshots of a case in-
volving a "void".
The force level dependence of optimal strategies, the
splitting of supporting fires, and the sensitivity of strat-
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